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Abstract
Common wisdom as well as well-grounded analytical arguments suggest that
stronger punishment of deviant behavior meted out by a principal typically prompts
the agents to better conform with his objectives. Addressing the speciﬁc issue
of donor-beneﬁciary relationships in the context of participatory development pro-
grams, we nevertheless show that greater tolerance on the part of donors may, under
certain conditions, favor rather than hurt the interests of the poor. Also, greater
uncertainty surrounding the donor’s knowledge regarding the poor’s preference may
have the same paradoxical eﬀect.
Critical features of our framework are: (i) communities are heterogeneous and
dominated by the local elite in dealing with external agencies, (ii) the elite choose
the project proposed to the donor strategically, knowing that the latter has a certain
amount of tolerance toward elite capture and an imperfect knowledge of the poor’s
priorities.
Keywords: community-driven development, aid eﬀectiveness, elite capture, corruption,
preference targeting.
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11 Introduction
Common wisdom as well as well-grounded analytical arguments suggest that stronger
punishment of deviant behavior meted out by a principal typically prompts the agents
to better conform with his objectives. Tolerance or laxity therefore appears as an inade-
quate behavior for principals to adopt. In the speciﬁc instance of aid relationships, this
means that more tolerant donors are less able to achieve their objectives, such as poverty
alleviation of marginal groups, than more strict donors. On the other hand, following the
realization that a top-down relationship, between donor and beneﬁciaries yields adverse
incentive eﬀects (see Kanbur 2006 for an overview), there has been growing emphasis on
ownership of aid budgets and decisions in recent literature and practice. This is exem-
pliﬁed by the drastic move toward decentralized or participatory development that has
taken place during the last decades. The donor community, bilateral and multilateral
agencies alike, have thus given more importance to participation in the design of their
development assistance programs, and have channeled substantial amounts of aid money
through local partner associations and municipalities or through Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs).1
Of course, the adoption of this new approach to development aid dos not mean
that donors can dispense with monitoring, but it does imply that beneﬁciary groups
should at least be granted more say in the identiﬁcation and selection of aid projects
so as to better use their informational advantage. In the presence of powerful local
elites, however, participatory mechanisms can be easily distorted as a result of preference
divergence between these elites and the common people whom donors are targeting.
Hence the need for the latter, in a context of imperfect information, to somehow assess
these people’s needs, and to act upon such an assessment with a view to mitigating the
eﬀect of preference divergence. One key ﬁnding of this paper, in which the above situation
is modeled, is the critical role of the degree of tolerance of the donor compared with the
degree of uncertainty (in the minds of the local elite) regarding the donor’s idea of the
poor’s preference. If the former is smaller than the latter, the following paradoxical
outcome may arise: a greater tolerance on the part of the donor favours, rather than
hurts, the interest of the poor. Analogously, if the latter is smaller than the former, a
greater uncertainty of the above type may yield the same paradoxical eﬀect.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss some relevant literature
and further specify the framework of analysis that we are going to use. In Section 3,
the model is presented and solved assuming that the donor’s idea regarding the poor’s
preference, as perceived by the local elite, follows a uniform probability distribution,
and that its unpredictability is larger than the donor’s tolerance. Section 4 then derives
detailed analytical results from this speciﬁc model. In addition to the paradoxical out-
come underlined above, the eﬀects of key parameters such as the fuzziness of the elite’s
1The World Bank, in particular, has made the so-called Community-Driven Development (CDD)
approach one of the cornerstones of its Comprehensive Development Framework, as reﬂected in the
World Development Report 2000/2001 devoted to poverty alleviation. The share of World Bank’s
projects with some degree of “civil society” involvement thus increased from 6 percent in the late 1980s
to over 70 percent in 2006 (cited from Werker and Ahmed, 2008, p. 75).
2perception of the donor’s knowledge, the extent of his tolerance toward elite capture, the
degree of heterogeneity of the beneﬁciary community (measured in terms of preference),
and the value attached by the elite and the poor to obtaining their preferred project,
are analyzed and discussed. In Section 5, we successively consider (i) the case where
the donor’s tolerance exceeds the degree of uncertainty surrounding his knowledge of
the poor’s preference and (ii) the possibility for him to choose whether to reveal or not
this knowledge or to introduce noise into the signal sent to the elite. In section 6, the
robustness of our most important result is veriﬁed by writing a general version of the
model in which the probability distribution and the utility functions of the two social
groups are no more restricted to speciﬁc forms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Our Contribution in the Perspective of the Existing Lit-
erature
Among the advantages generally associated with participatory forms of development is
the possession of private information by the beneﬁciary communities. Since communi-
ties are better aware of their own needs and the skills locally available to implement
projects on the ground, involving them in decisions regarding the choice and design of
local projects should yield more eﬀective development outcomes. In the recent literature,
however, there has been growing emphasis on the risk of overplaying the informational
advantages, particularly the preference targeting potential, of beneﬁciary groups (Con-
ning and Kevane, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Platteau, 2009). There are actually two
strands in this literature. They belong to diﬀerent disciplines and draw attention to two
diﬀerent aspects of the problem of preference revelation in decentralized development
setups.
The ﬁrst strand, in which social scientists other than economists clearly dominate,
stresses the strategic behavior followed by community representatives when they deal
with donor agencies. The central idea is that these representatives tend to propose
or submit development projects that match the perceived preference of the donor and,
therefore, depart from their true order of priorities. Abundant ﬁeld evidence actually
conﬁrms that, in eﬀect, communities introduce project proposals deemed to conform to
the donor’s wishes so as to secure access to the resources on oﬀer.
Based on his observations in Malawi, Tembo (2003) provides us with an elaborate
account of the concrete mechanisms of information distortion that can arise in participa-
tory development programs. His main contention is that people and communities tend
to profess the objectives, and adopt the style, methods, and language of the NGOs so
as to obtain access to their support. In his own words: “People’s preoccupation was to
align their requests with what an NGO was providing, in a sense of defending their posi-
tion for assistance even when the critical problem was something else... in most cases,
people were co-operative, in terms of giving appropriate answers to ﬁeldworkers, in order
to please them and have access to NGO assistance” (pp. 93-94, 125; in the same vein,
see Mosse, 1997, 2001; Laurent and Singleton, 1998; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bierschenk
et al., 2000; Eversole, 2003).
3Clearly, the problem of preference distortion arises here from the existence of diver-
gence between the community’s preference and the preference of the donor, at least as
it is being perceived by the community. A striking illustration of such a possibility is
supplied by the experience of Kerala, a southern Indian state which embarked upon an
ambitious program of decentralized development in 1996. There, indeed, some local gov-
ernments (called panchayats) thought that a project would be more likely to be ﬁnanced
by the central government if it was identical to those previously implemented by the state
or to the sort of projects presented as models by the State Planning Board, the oﬃce in
charge of decentralization (Gopinathan Nair, 2000; Harilal and Sanu George, 2000).
It bears noting that for the authors cited above community representatives are in-
duced to distort their preference declarations because of pervasive enforcement problems:
they know they will somehow be able to divert the aid funds to their own preferred pur-
poses after the money has been disbursed. However, even in the absence of enforcement
problems, preference distortion can conceivably arise for the obvious reason that it is
better to receive a gift and use it for a second-best purpose than forsaking it altogether.
In the words of a village chief from Burkina Faso: “if I give you a hen free, you won’t start
examining the ass to determine whether it is fat or thin. You just accept it.” (Guéneau
and Lecomte, 1998, p. 100).
The second strand of literature examines the impact of decentralized development in
the context of heterogeneous communities. The main idea is that the village elite is in
a position to subvert the participatory process thanks to their disproportionate weight
in the local decision-making mechanisms (Abraham and Platteau, 2002, 2004; Bardhan,
2002). To illustrate, in many of the World Bank’s Social Funds -a major instrument
for the ﬁnancing of participatory development projects by the Bank-, “prime movers”
of projects, such as village headmen or school teachers, often decide which project to
choose and implement before any community meeting ever takes place, and it is only
later that they take the step of informing community members of their project choice
(White and Eicher, 1999; Alsop et al., 2000; Blair, 2000; de Haan et al., 2002). The
sheer presence of the poor in local assemblies and meetings does not guarantee that their
voices will be heard. As pointed out by Behera and Engel (2006) on the basis of the
experience of the Joint Forestry Management (JFM) program in India (one of the most
comprehensive attempts at decentralization in the country), “minority groups, although
they may be formally given some authority in the JFM process, are still de facto kept
out of the decision-making process, which is likely to have serious repercussions on the
distribution of beneﬁts from the JFM forests” (p. 30). If they participate in JFM, it is
just to “state their loyalty to the village leadership” (Kumar, 2002, p. 776).
Since all negotiations with the external world take place through local leaders or
intermediaries, in the absence of genuine empowerment of marginal groups, the interests
of the elite are likely to be conveyed to donors, albeit under a garb that makes the
proposal acceptable to them (Tembo, 2003; Nygren, 2005).
When addressing this issue, economists often represent the local decision mechanism
as a form of representative democracy with (probabilistic) voting in which the poor, who
have diﬀerent preferences from the rich, have a relatively small weight (see Bardhan and
4Mookherjee, 2000, 2005, 2006, for purely theoretical expositions). In many cases, the
predictions following from the theory are then tested against the facts. There is no clear-
cut conclusion from this quickly expanding literature (see Mansuri and Rao, 2004 and
Platteau, 2009 for recent surveys). Diﬀerences in results may be partly explained by
methodological diﬃculties and partly by genuine variations between local environments.
None the less, a general conclusion that appears to emerge from many rigorous studies
is that in more socially and economically unequal village communities the participatory
mechanism tends to unduly favor the rich (Rosenzweig and Foster, 2003; Galasso and Ra-
vaillon, 2005; Rao and Ibáñez, 2005; Bardhan et al., 2008; Araujo et al., 2008; Labonne
and Chase, 2009). On the other hand, economists have recently analyzed the impact
of participation (and information) on the eﬀectiveness of project outcomes and the dis-
tribution of beneﬁts, leading to sometimes very contrasted conclusions (Chattopadhyay
and Duﬂo, 2004; Khwaja, 2004, 2009; Besley et al., 2005; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005;
Banerjee et al., 2008; Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009).
The present contribution aims at helping to bridge the gap between the two above
strands of the literature, by combining the strategic approach implicit in the ﬁrst with
the assumption of diﬀerentiated communities typical of the second. More speciﬁcally,
we consider heterogeneous communities in which an elite dominate the decision-making
process, yet are simultaneously subject to the donor’s discipline because the donor is eager
to alleviate poverty and has an (imprecise) idea of the nature of the poor’s priorities.
Moreover, the donor exhibits a certain degree of tolerance in accepting projects that
somewhat depart from his idea about the poor’s preference. In deciding which project to
propose, the elite behave strategically, taking into account the donor’s level of tolerance
as well as the fuzziness of their knowledge regarding the donor’s information about the
poor’s priorities. The framework is that of a modiﬁed version of the traditional ultimatum
game in which the donor accepts or not to ﬁnance a project proposed by the community.
In consonance with intuition and the above-mentioned literature, the elite will gen-
erally not propose the project preferred by the poor, and the more heterogeneous the
community the greater the distance between that project and the proposal submitted to
the donor (that is, the greater the amount of elite capture). For obvious reasons, special
attention will be devoted to the role of the donor’s tolerance level, which is conceivably
inﬂuenced by the prevailing intensity of donor competition. The commonsense predic-
tion that less tolerant donors are better able to discipline local elites and thus contribute
to poverty alleviation is called into question in our framework. This is because explicit
recognition is given to the role of the elite’s perception regarding the donor’s imperfect
idea of the poor’s preference. The possibility then arises that the elite have an incentive
to refrain from “exploiting” the donor’s greater tolerance by proposing a project better
matching their own preference.
We assume away all enforcement problems because allowing for them would make
our model more complex without bringing new interesting insights. It is evident that the
amount of elite capture resulting from the information gap between the donor and the
beneﬁciary community would increase in the presence of serious enforcement problems.
At the limit, if the donor is unable to monitor the use of the disbursed funds, the elite
5would propose the project that stands the best chance of being accepted by the donor.
Therefore, there would be no trade-oﬀ between considerations of probability of project
acceptance and considerations of project preference.
3 The Model
3.1 The intervening agents and their utilities
Since we are interested in the eﬀect of preference divergence in decentralized development
programs, we focus our attention on heterogeneous communities. More precisely, we
assume that a community is comprised of two groups, the target group (called t), which
the donor agency wants to support through an aid ﬂow, and the elite group (called l).
In fact, the term elite needs not necessarily be understood in a restrictive sense. It may
thus stand for the median voter while the target group represents minority groups or
marginal sections of the population, such as women, low-caste people, strangers, herders,
etc. In line with the objective of poverty reduction or emancipation of weak groups,
the donor’s utility function duly reﬂects the interests of the target group. Toward that
end, the donor relies on a participatory process aimed at determining the nature of the
needs of the target group. However, because the elite may interfere with the consultation
mechanism, an information gap subsists and prevents him from assessing with certainty
the genuine needs of this group. What the donor therefore maximizes is the expected
utility derived by the target group from the aid ﬂow. The decision to be taken is simply
to accept or refuse to ﬁnance a project submitted by the community (in fact, by the elite
group). A rejection of the project proposal occurs if the expected utility of the donor
is smaller than a reservation utility, ¯ U, reﬂects alternative uses of the available funds.
An interesting interpretation of this parameter is in terms of competition among donor
agencies: the stronger such competition the lower ¯ U.
The elite inﬂuence the participatory process in a decisive manner, and choose the
project to submit to the donor’s approval with the purpose of maximizing their own,
selﬁsh utility. Involved here is a trade oﬀ between two kinds of considerations: on the
one hand, the elite would like a project that is as close as possible to their own preference
but, on the other hand, by proposing a project diﬀering from what the donor believes to
be the target group’s preferred project, the elite causes a fall in the probability that the
donor will approve the proposal.
In order to keep our focus on the issue of strategic manipulation of preferences,
we abstract from any problem arising at the level of enforcement of the project once
approved. In other words, the elite have no possibility to embezzle the aid fund or to
modify the nature or the destination of the project. However, given the importance of
the enforcement problem in reality, we discuss in a non-formal manner its interaction
with the problem of information distortion. It must also be noted that the situation
considered is a one-period game in which the donor decides whether to allocate a given
amount of resources to a particular community in order to support target populations.
Although numerous types of projects can obviously be carried out in the community,
6we keep our analysis as simple as possible by assuming that the aid fund is to be split
between only two projects, named A and B. Preference heterogeneity is translated into
the fact that the elite and the target groups prefer diﬀerent mixes of the two projects. The
project proposal emanating from the community (the elite) also consists of proportions
of aid resources that are allocated to projects A and B. We assume, without loss of
generality, that compared to the elite group the target group prefers a mix in which
project B receives a larger proportion of the aid fund.
Let us deﬁne the proposed project mix (henceforth called simply the project) as θ,
measuring the share of the aid fund allocated to project A, so that θ ∈ [0,1]. The project
preferred by the target group is θt, while that preferred by the elite is θl. In agreement
with the above convention, we have that θl > θt. We can now write the utility functions
of all the intervening agents. Thus, the utility functions of the elite and the target groups
are, respectively: Ul (θ) = L − λ

θ − θl
 and Ut (θ) = T − τ

θ − θt
. We posit that, if
the donor refuses to support the community, the value of the utilities of both groups
is zero. Moreover, L,T,λ,τ ∈ R+
0 ; and L > λ,T > τ, so that Ul > 0 and Ut > 0 ∀
θ,θl,θt ∈ [0;1].
3.2 The informational and time structure of the game
The utility functions of the elite and the target group are assumed to be known by all
community members. The latter also know the value of ¯ U. As for the donor, he ignores
all the arguments of the utility function of the elite, yet does need to know the parameters
T and τ in the utility function of the target group. He nevertheless ignores the preferred
project of this group, θt. Indeed, if he knew θt, he would simply invest the proportion θt
of the available aid fund in project A, and the remaining proportion (1−θt) in project B.
The utility of the target group would thus be maximized and equal to T. The problem
of participatory development would then be trivial. In short, participatory development
does not make sense if the donor knows too little or too much. If he knows too much,
his objective is best achieved by adopting a centralized mechanism, and if he knows
too little, he has no means to discipline the elite who may manipulate the decentralized
mechanism.
The precise assumption that we make is that the donor receives an unbiased signal
θd = θt +ε, where ε is a random variable with E(ε) = 0. The underlying idea is that the
donor is able to gather information about the needs of the target group, yet is never in a
position to ascertain them in a completely reliable manner. For instance, he has a correct
perception of what the poor need in general, but cannot assess accurately how the nature
of such needs varies from one community to another. Such an assumption is warranted
since it is precisely when the needs of the poor or marginal groups are community-
speciﬁc that participatory or decentralized development programs are justiﬁed. The







. In words, we assume that the elite form an expectation
about what the donor regards as the poor’s preferred project, which implies that either
7the donor has not told them the realized value θd, or that the elite do not trust his
statement.
Note that, since E(θd) = θt, a donor imposing on the target community his view
about the project to be implemented would, on an average, meet the poor’s preference.
This is not suﬃcient, however, to make such imposition desirable since there is always
a risk that θd deviates from θt in particular instances. As we shall see, if the project
proposed by the elite in the participatory mechanism typically diﬀers from θt, there is
no attendant risk insofar as the amount of elite capture through information distortion
is constant. The decentralized mechanism is therefore not necessarily inferior to the
centralized solution.
We can now describe the timing of the game which comprises the following stages:
1) Nature picks up θd, the donor’s idea about the best project for the target group.
2) The elite group chooses θ, the project (mix) proposed to the donor by the commu-
nity.
3) After having received that proposition, the donor compares it to θd, and chooses
to either accept it, in which case he carries out θ, or reject it.













, for the elite group, the target group, and the
donor respectively, bearing in mind that E stands for the expectation operator. If
the donor rejects the community’s proposal, the payoﬀs of all community members
are zero, whether they belong to the elite or the target group, while the payoﬀ of
the donor is equal to ¯ U.
The question arises as to why, once nature has picked up θd, the donor does not make
a decision about what to reveal about this information. As a matter of fact, we cannot
rule out the possibility that the donor would be better oﬀ by either revealing θd to the
community or by choosing the degree of fuzziness that he may leave around θd than by
keeping θd as a purely private information. This decision of strategic communication of
private information has been discussed in a very general fashion by Crawford and Sobel
(1982), and more recently, in a framework more similar to our model, by Banerjee and
Somanathan (2001). The problem, here, is that the donor is not able to make such a
decision unless he knows the parameters of the elite’s utility function, and, if this were
true, his position would be actually closer to that of a well-informed centralized planner.
For example, he could choose to reveal θd, anticipating that the elite would then propose
a project as close to θd as his tolerance permits.
To avoid this situation in which the idea of participation of the community and the
possibility of its manipulation by the elite are losing most of their practical meaning,
we assume that the donor is completely ignorant about the elite’s utility function and
the game moves directly from stage 1 to stage 2 as described above. However, we are
interested in knowing how our results would be aﬀected by assuming a better informed
donor who strategically reports information to the target community. As we will see in
section 5.2., this exercise will prove useful to put all our results into perspective.
83.3 Resolution of the model
Solving the game backwards, we ﬁrst examine the decision of the donor. He will choose
to allocate his available aid fund to the community if his expected payoﬀ from doing so
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θ − θd
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T − ¯ U
τ
= k
where k can be conceived of as the donor’s tolerance toward elite capture. Bear





≥ ¯ U. Clearly, the elite group will make their decision not on the basis of
the decision rule followed by the donor, but on the basis of the decision rule that it
believes the donor follows. Note, moreover, that if ¯ U > T, the donor always rejects the
community’s proposal. The case worth discussing is therefore when T ≥ ¯ U.
In order to proceed with the resolution of the model, we need two additional as-
sumptions. First, we consider the case where the tolerance of the donor does not exceed
the domain of uncertainty regarding his idea of the poor’s preferred project, that is, we
assume T−¯ U
τ ≤ 1
2ϕ. And second, the preferred project of the elite, θl, is distant enough
from the target group’s preferred project, θt, to give rise to a positive amount of distor-
tion in the elite’s project proposal. More precisely, preference heterogeneity inside the
community must be strong enough to have θl−θt > 1
2ϕ +k.While the second assumption
is necessary to make the problem interesting, the ﬁrst assumption is not innocuous and
actually conditions some of the key results obtained. We will therefore examine the case
where T−¯ U
τ > 1
2ϕ, after having elucidated the ﬁrst case.
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, the probability that θ will be accepted by the donor is equal to :
P(θ) = Pr
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θ − θd
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The above expressions can be easily derived in the light of Figure 1 below, which has
been drawn under the aforementioned assumption that θl ≥ θt.













  is accepted by the donor
k k
Figure 1: The distribution of the donor’s idea of the poor’s preferred project, as perceived
by the elite.
To solve the elite maximization problem, four diﬀerent cases must be distinguished
depending on the position of θ on the horizontal axis.
The ﬁrst case corresponds to the domain in which the probability that the project is
accepted is constant (equal to 2kϕ), which happens when θt − 1
2ϕ +k ≤ θ ≤ θt + 1
2ϕ −k.
Within this domain, there is actually no trade-oﬀ between the acceptance probability and
the distance between the project proposed by the elite and their own preferred project.
Therefore, the elite chooses the maximum accessible value for θ, which is the upper bound
of the domain, θ = θt + 1
2ϕ − k.
10The second case obtains when the zone of the donor’s tolerance is no more en-
tirely contained within the zone of variation of the elite’s perception (more precisely
the elite’s perception of the donor’s idea of the poor’s preferred project), that is, when
θt + 1
2ϕ − k < θ < θt + 1
2ϕ + k. Unlike in the previous region, the probability of project
acceptance now decreases with θ. Since the elite’s utility obviously increases with θ,
they are now facing a trade-oﬀ. The ﬁrst-order condition of the elite’s expected utility
maximization leads to the following solution: θ = 1
2
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θl + θt + 1




check that this solution falls in the above-deﬁned interval: 1
2

θl + θt + 1






2ϕ − k;θt + 1
2ϕ + k
i
. Simple algebra shows that the upper bound will never be
exceeded by the local optimum θ. As for the lower bound, it will not be crossed as long










. When this condition is violated, the solution is again
found in the ﬁrst domain. It is useful to note, moreover, that if the distance between the
preferred projects of the elite and the target groups is smaller than a certain threshold,
the above-obtained solution for θ within the second domain is larger than the value of the
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In this case, the local optimum coincides with the elite’s preferred project : θ = θl.
In the third case, the zone of the donor’s tolerance is entirely located outside the
zone of variation of the elite’s perception: θ > θt + 1
2ϕ + k. The probability of project
acceptance is zero, and the elite chooses the value of θ that corresponds to the upper
bound that deﬁnes the second domain (where this probability is falling).
In the last case, where θ ≤ θt− 1
2ϕ +k, the probability of project acceptance increases
as θ becomes larger. Since the rise of θ also raises the elite’s utility derived from the
project if accepted, it will choose as high a value as possible, that is, the value that
corresponds to the lower bound of the ﬁrst domain (where this probability is constant).
We are now in a position to derive the optimal choice of the elite group. As the above
discussion shows, there are only two possible optimum values for θ, if we leave aside the
special case in which θ = θl. In order to determine whether the global optimum is located
in the ﬁrst or in the second domain, we compute the value of the indirect expected utility
of the elite group in the ﬁrst domain and compare it to the value of the same in the second
domain. After some algebraic manipulation, we ﬁnd that the former exceeds the latter










. All the results are summarized below, where we have
deﬁned the conditions under which we arrive at particular optimal values not only for
θbut also for the distance between θ and θt, which measures the amount of distortion
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Which can be written as:
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By enabling us to get a visual picture of the main results, Figure 2 facilitates their
discussion.
k > 1/3 [1/2φ - (θ
l - θ
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Figure 2: The expected utility of the elite











the expected utility of the elite group is a linear function of the value of the project
proposal. The optimum, θ∗, is the corner solution ensuring that (θ∗ + k) coincides with





: eager to maximize the probability of project
acceptance, the elite makes a proposal that gets as close as possible to its preferred











we exclude the particular case where θ∗ = θl, the elite’s expected utility has an inverted-
U shape, and an interior solution exists in this second domain. The elite group trades a
decline in the probability of project acceptance against the selection of a project closer
to its ideal.
Note that under a special conﬁguration of parameters the elite group is certain that
its project proposal will be accepted by the donor. When this happens, the proposal
12coincides with the preferred project of the target group, and the distortion caused by
the participatory process is nil. The conditions under which this special result obtains










and k = 1
2ϕ. The ﬁrst condition ensures
that we are in the ﬁrst domain while the second one yields P(θ) = 1, from which it
automatically follows that θ∗ = θt. Thus, when the domain of variation of the elite’s
perception is exactly equal to the extent of the donor’s tolerance, and this extent of
tolerance is not too large, the ﬁrst-best outcome may be achieved (the target group
obtains its maximum utility, T, with certainty) although the elite group is in complete
control of the project selection process.
The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1. When the amount of tolerance of the donor is not too high, the elite
will choose a project in such a way that the probability of its acceptance is maximized.
Only under very special conditions will this probability equal unity. When the donor’s
tolerance level exceeds a certain threshold, all other things being equal, the elite becomes
ready to trade a fall in the acceptance probability against the selection of a project closer
to its ideal.
Note also that the amount of distortion is higher in the second than in the ﬁrst
domain where the probability of project acceptance is at its maximum level. Indeed, we











2ϕ − k < 1
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4 Results and discussion
Let us ﬁrst look at the factors determining the level of distortion inside each domain.
It is immediately apparent that the smaller the fuzziness of the elite’s perception of the
donor’s knowledge regarding the target group’s priorities (the higher the value of ϕ)
the smaller the distortion in both domains. Inside the second domain, the amount of
distortion increases linearly with the gap between the preferred projects of the elite and
the target group (it remains constant inside the ﬁrst domain). Conversely, the amount
of distortion decreases linearly with this distance, implying that, as expected, when
the community becomes more homogeneous the project proposed by the elite better
answers to the needs of the target group. Inside the same second domain, the more
sensitive the elite’s utility to the distance between their preferred project and the actual
proposal (the higher the value of λ), or the lower the maximum value which they attach
to their preferred project (L), the larger the distortion of information . These results are
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The less fuzzy the elite’s perception of the donor’s knowledge regard-
ing the target group’s priorities, the less heterogeneous the community (the smaller the
preference divergence between the elite and the target group), the less sensitive the elite
to the choice of a project diﬀerent from their preferred one or the higher the maximum
13value which they attach to their preferred project, the smaller the amount of elite capture
through information distortion.
More unexpected is the inversion of the impact of the donor’s tolerance level on
the equilibrium distortion as one shifts from the ﬁrst to the second domain: while this
impact is negative in the ﬁrst domain, it becomes positive in the second domain. There
thus exists a domain in which, rather paradoxically increasing tolerance on the part of
the donor reduces the distortion caused by the participatory mechanism, and therefore







































Here is an apparent paradox because one would have expected the elite to always re-
spond to a relaxing of the donor’s vigilance by making a proposal closer to their preferred
choice. Understanding the odd outcome that occurs when k is smaller than the above
threshold value, ¯ k, takes us to the heart of our model’s logic. As a matter of fact, when
making their decision about which project to propose, the elite do not only take account
of the donor’s tolerance level but also of the degree of uncertainty about what he thinks
is the target group’s preferred project, and the way these two parameters interact. As
a result, it cannot be taken for granted that the elite will “exploit” the donor’s greater
tolerance. More precisely, when the donor becomes more tolerant while the uncertainty
about his idea of the poor’s preference remains unchanged, the elite worry about the
fact that getting the project proposal closer to their own preference, thus “exploiting”
the donor’s greater tolerance, will cause the probability of project acceptance to fall.
The problem arises because the donor tolerates greater variation not with respect to the
poor’s preferred project (which he ignores) but with respect to his own idea of the poor’s
preference, an idea that the elite can only ﬁgure out. As a consequence of this feature of
our model, the eﬀect of an increase in k is to raise the maximum level of P (θ) yet over
a narrower range than before.
The elite may therefore be prompted to reduce the information bias so as to achieve
this new maximum. Assume that the elite initially make a proposal corresponding to the
corner solution θ∗ = θt + 1
2ϕ − k. No reduction in θ can cause the probability of project
acceptance to increase: P (θ) is at its maximum level. When the donor’s tolerance
margin is enlarged (k rises), however, this is no more true: reducing the information bias
(getting θ closer to θt) so as to make the new value (θ∗ + k) again coincide with the





, allows the elite to achieve the new, higher
value of MaxP (θ).
The reason why this new maximum value extends over a narrower range than before
becomes evident when one sees that, in Figure 1, the eﬀect of an increase in k is to stretch
14the hatched zone both below and above their initial limits. In particular, extending this






has the eﬀect of causing the probability P (θ) to fall since
there is now an area where, in the minds of the elite , the donor will never associate a
project with the preference of the target group. There is thus a zone in which, owing
to non-coincidence of donor’s and elite’s perceptions, the increased tolerance on the part
of the former is not “exploitable” by the latter. If the elite would stick to their previous
project proposal, therefore, the probability P (θ) would no more be at its maximum level,
which also implies that the domain over which P (θ) takes on its maximum value is more
restricted than before.
In Figure 3 where θ is measured along the horizontal axis and the probability of
project acceptance, P(θ), (rather than the density of θd) is measured along the vertical















Figure 3: The eﬀect of an increase in k on the probability of project acceptance.
A higher value of k manifests itself in both a leftward shift of the upper bound of the
ﬁrst domain and a raising of its ceiling corresponding to the maximum value of P(θ). If k











bound which is now smaller remains the (corner) solution of the elite’s maximization
problem. Indeed, since the whole distribution of P(θ) has been raised as a result of a
higher k, the elite want to remain in the domain where MaxP(θ) is accessible. If, on the
other hand, the above condition is no more satisﬁed as k increases, the solution will lie in
the second domain where the elite is ready to accept a certain increase in the probability
15that their proposal stands rejected in order to get closer to their preferred choice.
Since the inverse relationship between the donor’s tolerance and the equilibrium dis-
tortion holds only inside the ﬁrst domain, a careful look at the parameter values satisfying
the condition k ≤ ¯ k allows us to identify the factors susceptible of yielding the odd out-
come. The eﬀects are straightforward and we state them in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3. An increased level of donor’s tolerance toward elite capture is susceptible
of prompting the elite group to propose a project (mix) closer to, and not further away
from, the preference of the target group. This odd outcome is more likely to be observed
if, other things being equal, the donor’s initial tolerance level is low; the variability of the
elite’s perception (of the donor’s idea of the poor’s preferred project) is large; the distance
between the preferred projects of the elite and the target groups is small; the maximum
utility achievable by the elite is large; and the sensitivity of the latter group to the distance
between its preferred project and the actual project is small.
Finally, since k = T−¯ U
τ , a higher level of tolerance can be interpreted as being the
result of three diﬀerent factors. First, it can be seen as the result of a fall in the outside
options available to the donor, which may itself follow from growing competition among
the donors themselves (see supra). Whereas donor competition might be considered as
detrimental to the poor, we have shown that, in our framework, this needs not be the
case. Within a certain range of variation, an increase in donor competition has the eﬀect
of prompting the elite to take greater account of the preference of the target group.
Outside that range, however, growing competition among donors promotes the interests
of the elite.
Second, enhanced tolerance of the donor may be the result of a lower sensitivity of
the target group to the distance between its preferred project and the realized project
(a lower value of τ). And, third, it may follow from a rise of the constant component
in the target group’s utility function (a higher value of T). Insofar as members of this
group have a higher utility for a given distance between their preferred project and the
realized project, the donor’s vigilance is relaxed.
The variability of the elite’s perception (ϕ), in the minds of the community in general
and the elite in particular, obviously plays a key role in our model. It is a determinant
of the probability of project acceptance (regardless of the domain) and the equilibrium
distortion while it simultaneously inﬂuences the selection of the domain where the global




, and raises the likelihood that the global optimum is located in
the ﬁrst domain. All these eﬀects will therefore take place if the donor is able to conceal
the information about his preference so that ϕ is reduced. An immediate implication of
the above is that concealing information yields two opposite eﬀects on the equilibrium




within each domain, but, on the other hand, it raises the probability that
the global optimum falls in the (ﬁrst) domain where this gap is smaller.
Is it possible that, should the latter eventuality materialize, the increasing fuzziness
of the elite’s perception will eventually prompt the elite to propose a project closer to the
16preferred project of the target group? The answer is negative. Simple algebraic manipu-
lation shows that the eﬀect of increased distortion within the ﬁrst domain outweighs the
eﬀect of the shift from the second to the ﬁrst domain (see Appendix B). The conclusion
is that it is never in the interest of the donor (nor the target group) to deliberately make
information more fuzzy. In other words, it is essential that the donor preference for the
poor is known as well as possible. Since ϕ presumably varies not only with the com-
munity’s perception but also with the extent of the donor’s knowledge about the target
group’s preference, it is also in the interest of the donor and the target group, that the
donor possesses as precise knowledge as possible about this preference.
5 Two variants
In this section, we depart from the main model in an important manner. First, we
consider the case where the donor’s tolerance exceeds the fuzziness of the community’s
perception of the donor’s idea of the poor’s preferred project. Second, we reﬁne the game
structure by adding a second stage in which the donor may choose between keeping
his idea about the poor’s preference secret, revealing it, or inﬂuencing the degree of
unpredictability of this idea for the community.
5.1 The case of a relatively tolerant donor
When 1
2ϕ < T−¯ U
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Whereas in the previous case where 1
2ϕ > k, the sign of k in the deﬁnition of θ∗ was
changing when moving from the ﬁrst to the second domain, the opposite happens in the
case where 1
2ϕ < k: the sign of k remains unchanged but the sign of 1
2ϕ is now inverted.
17The conditions delimiting the relevant domains are also aﬀected. As a consequence of
these changes, the results summarized in the three above propositions are partially or
wholly modiﬁed. The critical factor determining the changes in the results arises from
the fact that to maximize the probability of project acceptance the elite must propose a
project such that θ∗ −k = θt − 1
2ϕ, implying that the lower bound of the interval around
θ∗chosen by the elite must coincide with the lower, and not any more with the upper
bound of the fuzziness domain θt − 1
2ϕ.
To begin with, proposition 1 must be simply rewritten thus: When the amount of
tolerance of the donor is not too low, the elite will choose a project in such a way that
the probability of its acceptance is maximized, and equal to unity. When the donor’s
tolerance level is below a certain threshold, all other things being equal, the elite becomes
ready to trade a fall in the acceptance probability against the selection of a project closer
to its ideal.
Proposition 2 does not vary except for the part dealing with the relationship between
the fuzziness of elite perception and the amount of elite capture. As a matter of fact, this
relationship is now V-shaped: as the elite’s perception of the donor’s knowledge becomes
more fuzzy, the amount of distortion decreases but only up to a certain threshold of
fuzziness beyond which it starts increasing.
As for Proposition 3, it ceases to hold true.
When taken together, these results mean that the paradoxical ﬁnding has shifted
from Proposition 3 to Proposition 2. Oddly, over a certain range, the elite is better
disciplined when its perception of the donor’s knowledge regarding the poor’s preference
becomes more fuzzy. What needs to be emphasized is that this fuzziness rather than
the donor’s tolerance is now the most constraining consideration in the minds of the
elite. When it increases, there are two eﬀects running into opposite directions. On the
one hand, the elite is in a position to better exploit the large tolerance of the donor by
moving to a project closer to its own preference. Yet, on the other hand, the project
has the highest chance to be accepted (in fact, a 100% chance) if the elite respond to
the increased fuzziness by proposing a project closer to the poor’s preference. This is
because maximum probability of project acceptance can be achieved only if the lower
bound of the chosen interval of the tolerance domain, θ∗−k, is adjusted in such a way as
to remain confounded with the now diminished value of the lower bound of the fuzziness
domain, θt − 1
2ϕ.
To understand the case 1
2ϕ < T−¯ U
τ by analogy with the case where 1
2ϕ > T−¯ U
τ , it
helps to refer again to Figure 3 in which the maximum probability of project acceptance
is now a constant equal to unity rather than a value moving with ϕ.
For the sake of completeness, note that the impact of an increased variability of the
elite’s perception can no more be depicted by the monotonous relationship underlying
the comments below Proposition 3.
185.2 The 5-stage model
We can now turn to the second variant, in which the donor is allowed more strategy
space in the way depicted in the second stage of the adjusted game below:
1) Nature picks up θd, the donor’s idea about the best project for the target group.
2) The donor has to choose between three diﬀerent strategies:
– strategy r: to reveal θd to the community














2x is chosen by the
donor
3) The elite group chooses θi, the project (mix) proposed to the donor by the com-
munity, i = {r,s,x} and is related to the strategy chosen by the donor.
4) After having received that proposal, the donor compares it to θd, and chooses to
either accept it, in which case he carries out θ, or reject it.













, for the elite group, the target group, and the
donor respectively. If the donor rejects the community’s proposal, the payoﬀs of all
community members are zero, whether they belong to the elite or the target group,
while the payoﬀ of the donor is equal to ¯ U.
Bear in mind that, to be able to take a decision at stage 2, the donor needs to know
the parameters of the elite’s utility function in addition to those of the poor’s utility
function. When this is the case, and a few other assumptions are made, we reach the
conclusion that it is in the interest of the donor either to reveal its signal θd to the
community (in which case the elite respond by proposing project equal to θd +k) , or to
set an optimal value for x, that inﬂuences the elite’s perceptions regarding his knowledge
about the poor’s preferred project (see Appendix C, for a detailed proof). In other
words, the donor is worse oﬀ by keeping his signal secret when he has the possibility
to use this knowledge strategically. Such a conclusion is congruent with the ﬁnding by
Crawford and Sobel (1982) that in a model of strategic communication the interest of the
Sender is to introduce noise into the signal reported to the Receiver. Moreover, when the
donor chooses x, he will always set its value so that the degree of fuzziness of the elite’s
perception does not exceed the degree of his own tolerance: 1
2x ≤ k. This is important
since we know from the discussion above that in this case the paradox of Proposition 3
vanishes, yet the relationship between the fuzziness of elite’s perception and the amount
of elite capture through information distortion is not monotonous but V-shaped. We can
now add that, if enabled to do so, the donor will choose the noise around the signal sent
to the community in such a way as to minimize elite capture.
196 The model generalized
Before turning to the conclusion, we must check whether our results, in particular the
ambiguous impact of the donor’s tolerance on the project proposal by the community,
have been achieved on the basis of restrictive assumptions regarding the utility functions
of the agents involved and the exact form of the probability function for the elite’s
perception. As we show below, our results turn out to be quite general.







. This uniform distribution takes on strictly positive values only on
an interval of limited size. As a result, the probability that a project is accepted and
the optimal choice of the community depend on some threshold values related to the
support of the distribution. Such an approach enabled us to keep the algebra simple and
to derive a number of precise and insightful results.
As before, we only discuss the case where θl > θt. The utility functions of the target
group and the elite now have a general form, Ut(θ) and Ul (θ), and they are assumed
to be always positive, continuous and twice diﬀerentiable. They depend negatively on




0 > 0 if θ < θt and

Ut (θ)
0 < 0 if θ > θt. Likewise, we have:

Ul (θ)
0 > 0 if θ < θl and

Ul (θ)
0 < 0 if θ > θl. Both utility functions are concave and
they reach their maximum value when θ equals the preferred project:

Ui  
θi00 < 0 and 
Ui  
θi0 = 0, i = {t,l}. The donor receives a signal θd = θt + ε where E [ε] = 0. In




= θd. Community members do not know θd but believe that
it is distributed according to the density function f
 
θd
. This function is assumed
to be continuous, diﬀerentiable, and symmetric around θt, the mean value. Moreover,
[f (θ)]
0 > 0 if θ < θt;[f (θ)] 0 < 0 if θ > θt.
The donor accepts the project proposed by the elite (θ) if, given the signal, the target


















are known to the donor except θt,
and given that E
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−1 = k with k0
¯ U < 0
The elite knows that their proposition is accepted if
 θd − θ
  ≤ k ⇐⇒ θ − k ≤ θd ≤
θ + k, which happens with a probability equal to:
P (θ) = Pr

θ − k ≤ θd ≤ θ + k

= F (θ + k) − F (θ − k)
20where F (θ) stands for the cumulative probability function associated to the above
deﬁned density function, f
 
θd
. The elite choose the project proposal that maximizes
their own expected utility:
θ∗ ≡ argmaxP (θ)Ul(θ) = [F (θ + k) − F (θ − k)]Ul(θ)
The ﬁrst order condition is:





It is easily shown that there exists no corner solution to this problem. Indeed, if
θ = θt, then f (θ + k) = f (θ − k) because f(θ) is symmetric around θt. Therefore, the
ﬁrst term is nil, while the second term is obviously positive, causing the LHS of the
above condition to be unambiguously positive. Since raising θ above θt would increase
the expected utility, θ = θt is not optimal. If θ = θl, on the other hand, the ﬁrst term
is negative because the ﬁrst derivative of f(θ) with respect to θ is negative when θ > θt.
As for the second term, it is nil since Ul(θl)0 = 0. The LHS of the condition is therefore
negative, implying that θ = θl cannot be an optimum.
It follows from the above proof that the elite’s expected utility is necessarily concave
in some relevant interval of θt < θ < θl. We have indeed shown that at the lower bound,
θt, the slope of this function is unambiguously positive while at the upper bound, θl, it
is unambiguously negative. Since the function has positive values and is continuous and
diﬀerentiable by assumption, this implies that it must be concave in at least some part
of the interval comprised between these two bounds. Moreover, θ∗, the maximum value
of θ, must necessarily lie on a concave portion of the function.



















It is easy to see that the above expression cannot be signed unambiguously. Since
the whole denominator, which corresponds to the second-order condition of the elite’s
optimization problem, is negative, and the expression is preceded by a minus sign, ∂θ∗/∂k
will have the same sign as the numerator. In other words, the odd case in which ∂θ∗/∂k <
0, -more laxity on the part of the donor, reﬂected in a larger k, is beneﬁcial to the poor
in the sense that θ∗ gets nearer to their preferred project, θt- will obtain if the numerator
is negative. Since the second term of this numerator is obviously positive, we need to
have that the ﬁrst term has a negative sign and that its absolute value exceeds the value
of the second term. The meaning of these conditions needs to be elucidated.
The donor’s level of tolerance exerts two eﬀects on the optimal decision of the elite,
and they run into opposite directions. The positive direct eﬀect, which is measured by
the second term of the numerator, indicates that a higher level of tolerance increases the
probability that the proposition is accepted, which induces the elite to propose a project
better corresponding to their preference. As for the indirect eﬀect, which is embodied in
21the ﬁrst term, it reﬂects the fact that a variation of the tolerance level (k) modiﬁes the
marginal impact of the elite’s proposition (θ) on the probability of project acceptance.
Let us ﬁrst consider the inﬂuence of an increase in θ on that probability. It is evident
that it is lowered by f (θ − k) and increased by f (θ + k), and that the net eﬀect is always
negative when θ > θt, which necessarily obtains at equilibrium. Second, we must examine
the impact of an increase in k on the variation of the probability of project acceptance
resulting from the induced change in θ. Increasing the donor’s tolerance (k) appears to
have the eﬀect of decreasing f (θ + k) and f (θ − k), provided that θ−k > θt. In short, a
higher level of tolerance generally magniﬁes the fall in the project acceptance’s probability
when the elite raises θ. However, this is not true if
 [f (θ∗ + k)]
0  < [f (θ∗ − k)]
0. Such
a special case, which may occur when θ∗ − k < θt, actually corresponds to the situation
in which the donor’s tolerance domain is relatively large compared to the domain of
fuzziness of elite’s perception (see Section 5).
In order to better visualize the nature of the conditions involved, we have drawn
Figure 4. It is apparent that moving θ closer to θl and further away from θt has the
marginal eﬀect of lowering the probability of project acceptance (the hatched zone) by
(a − b). If k rises in the way indicated by the two horizontal arrows, this probability
obviously increases. This is the ﬁrst direct eﬀect discussed above. However, a larger k has
the additional, indirect eﬀect of increasing the marginal impact of θ on the probability
of project acceptance. Indeed, because the slope of the density function decreases in its
relevant portion, moving θ closer to θl causes a fall in this probability by (a0−b0) > (a−b).














  is accepted by the donor
Figure 4: The direct and indirect eﬀects of an increase in the donor’s level of tolerance.
To conclude, for the odd eﬀect to exist, it must be the case that the impact of a
22change in k on the marginal eﬀect of the project proposal on the acceptance probability
is suﬃciently important relative to its direct impact on the same probability. Whether
the indirect eﬀect outweighs the direct one clearly depends on the characteristics of the
density function of θd, and of the utility function of the elite. As we have seen in the
preceding sections, this outcome occurs inside the ﬁrst domain obtaining with the uniform
distribution.
7 Conclusion
Participatory development is highly vulnerable to the risk of elite capture. Among the
two main forms of elite capture, embezzlement and information distortion, the latter has
been best documented empirically and worked out theoretically. However, the inﬂuence
of the elite is typically assumed to exert itself through the local collective decision-
making process without the donor being able to constrain it. In this contribution, we
have followed a diﬀerent approach in which the donor pursues the explicit objective of
poverty alleviation and has an imprecise idea of what the priorities of the poor, his target
group, look like. This is suﬃcient to somewhat discipline the elite by giving rise to a
trade-oﬀ between considerations of probability of project acceptance and considerations
of project preference.
A noteworthy result is that the less heterogeneous the community (the smaller the
distance between the elite’s and the poor’s preferred projects), and the less sensitive the
elite to the choice of a project diﬀerent from their preferred one, the smaller the amount
of elite capture through information distortion.
More unexpected is the key role played by the relative importance of the donor’s
tolerance compared with the degree of uncertainty regarding his knowledge of the poor’s
preference. When the former is smaller than the latter, the following paradox may arise:
greater donor’s tolerance toward elite capture may serve rather than hurt the interests of
the poor. When the latter is smaller than the former, the possible paradox is diﬀerent:
greater fuzziness of the elite’s perception may again be favourable to the poor.
Finally, if the donor had enough information about the elite’s preference function,
he would be able to choose what to do with his knowledge of the poor’s preference.
The main conclusion here is that in the equilibrium situation resulting from the donor’s
strategy, greater tolerance may not beneﬁt the poor.
A complex pattern of eﬀects thus emerges from our rather simple analytical frame-
work, and they manifest the operation of important mechanisms that need to be taken
into account when designing decentralized development programs. There are interesting,
unexpected policy implications following from our analysis. Thus, to the extent that
the donor’s tolerance toward elite capture increases with the intensity of donor compe-
tition, we may expect this enhanced competition to yield beneﬁcial eﬀects for the poor
if the elite cannot precisely assess the donor’s idea of the poor’s preference (and if the
beneﬁciary communities are suﬃciently homogeneous).
23Appendix A
In the elite’s maximization problem, the discontinuity in the project acceptance prob-
ability function gives rise to the existence of diﬀerent domains. The optimal value of θ in
each domain has been derived. It is straightforward that the ﬁrst-order conditions lead
to two local optima: θt+ 1
2ϕ −k in the ﬁrst domain, and 1
2

θl + θt + 1




second domain, leaving aside the special case where this last solution is larger than θl.
In order to determine the condition under which the global optimum is located in the
ﬁrst domain, we compute the value of the indirect expected utility of the elite group in
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
8k(X − k) ≥ (X + k)2 where X = L
λ − θl + θt + 1
2ϕ
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We prove that an increase in the elite’s perception variability ( 1
2ϕ) can never prompt
the elite to propose a project closer to the poor’s preferred project. We know from the
maximization of elite’s utility that the optimal proposal is increasing in 1
2ϕ in all domains.
However, a larger 1
2ϕ may cause the global optimum to shift from the ﬁrst to the second
domain. If this is the case, we have to check that the new equilibrium proposal located
in the ﬁrst domain cannot be smaller than the initial one.
Assume that, initially, the global optimum is located in the second domain:
1
2ϕ




















For the new equilibrium proposal located in the ﬁrst domain to be smaller than the initial





− k < 1
2

θl + θt + 1












< 3k + θl − θt + L
λ = X (3)
It is immediate that (2) and (3) imply 1
2ϕ > X, which contradicts (1).
25Appendix C
For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to the case where θl −θt > 1
ϕ, θt − 1
2ϕ > 0 and
θt + 1











We also assume that 2k < 1
2ϕ and that the donor knows all parameters of the elite
and target groups utility functions except θt.
We solve the new game by backward induction :
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2. The elite group chooses the project θ that maximizes their own expected utility :
(a) If the donor chooses strategy r and reveals θd to the community, it is immediate
that the elite’s optimal response is to ask for project:
θr = θd + k







. This is the case that we developed:
P (θ) =
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where he chooses 1
2x. This case is solved with the same method as the previous
one. If 1
2x > k, the solution is (notice that unlike the previous case, the solution
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E [θx] = θs if 1
2x = 1
2ϕ
27Knowing this, the donor will choose the value of x that minimizes the ex-
pected distance between θx and θt. From this expression, E [θx]−θt is strictly
decreasing in 1
2x. Note that, the solution changes if 1
2x < k because the prob-
ability of project acceptance function, P (θ), has changed:
P (θ) =

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2x < k the bias in the proposal is not strictly decreasing in 1
2x any
more. To ﬁnd the optimal value of 1
2x, we should consider two diﬀerent cases:
i. When θl − θd > L










































ii. When θl − θd ≤ L








































if θl − θd > L
λ − 2k
28Therefore the elite’s optimal proposal becomes equal to:













2θd + 2k + θl − L
λ

if θl − θd > L
λ − 2k
3. Given his signal θd, the donor chooses the strategy i = {r,s,x} that minimizes






(a) First, we compare r and s. Given θr and θs above:
dr = E
h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: r is preferred to s if ds > dr ⇐⇒ 1
2ϕ −k >
k ⇐⇒ 1
2ϕ > 2k which is always true (by assumption).
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
> k ⇐⇒ θl − θd > L
λ + k − 1
2ϕ, otherwise s is
preferred to r.
i. Conclusion: r is preferred to s if θl − θd > L
λ + k − 1
2ϕ, otherwise s is
preferred to r.
(b) Second, we compare r and x:
dr = E
h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λ −2k: x is preferred to r if 1
3
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θl − θd < L
λ + k, otherwise r is preferred to x.
29iii. Conclusion: x is preferred to r if θl −θd < L
λ +k, otherwise r is preferred
to x.
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⇐⇒ θl−θd > k−3 1
2ϕ −
L
λ which is impossible because k − 3 1
2ϕ − L
λ < 0 ( 1
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2ϕ −k ⇐⇒ θl−θd < L
λ +3 1





λ − 3k + 1
2ϕ.
iv. Conclusion: x is preferred to s if θl − θd < L
λ − 3k + 1
2ϕ, otherwise s is
preferred to x






s is preferred to r
L/λ+k-1/2φ L/λ+k-1/2φ
r is preferred to s
x is preferred to r r is preferred to x
s is preferred to x x is preferred to s
Optimal 
strategy: x r
(in this ﬁgure, we considered that 1
2ϕ > 4k which implies L
λ − k < L
λ − 3k + 1
2ϕ)





x if θl − θd ≤ L
λ − k
r if θl − θd > L
λ − k
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